Jump to content

Platino report finally out


Recommended Posts

The big question everyone has been asking is why was nothing done to even try and help Steve?

 

The report askes the same thing but offers no answers, it makes it a little worse if anything.

 

 

 

 

Link to post
Share on other sites

I've emailed maritime nz on crew.org.nz's behalf to ask for a copy of the report.

We'll see what they say. I believe it's in the NZ sailing community's interest to have access to these reports for educational purposes.

  • Upvote 4
Link to post
Share on other sites

Wheres the report? Apparently the public are too dumb for anything except PFD slogans https://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/commercial/safety/accidents-reporting/accident-reports/

Maritime NZ no longer produces accident investigation reports for public publication. It was determined these were not widely read, particularly by parts of the community for whom safety was not a priority. It now aims to highlight safety messages through other avenues, including our magazine “Lookout!”.

 

This is deeply worrying. What the f*ck is going on? It's like MNZ are so hopeless at investigating anything, and slow and releasing anything, they just want to sweep everything under the carpet.

 

Move along, nothing to see here...

Link to post
Share on other sites

Maritime NZ no longer produces accident investigation reports for public publication. 

 

So they purport to hold mariners accountable for their actions, but aren't willing to be accountable themselves. Absolute crooks.

 

And the fact that Newshub would publish an interview with the victim's family when the survivors haven't even reviewed the report yet is pretty slimy as well.

 

Also, could someone please stitch Patrick Gower's sleeves to the side of his jacket. It's hard to absorb much of what he says when a good chunk of my brain is tied up processing the sight of him flinging his arms around.

Link to post
Share on other sites

That is some appalling journolism there. Reminds me why I don't bother watching TV anymore.

Completely emotive, blaming the survivors for not saving the causality in the water. But no facts at all on any aspect of what actually happened.

It did say the yacht passed close by him twice, indicating they may have actually been attempting to save him. No comment on that though.

But then goes on to comment the survivors are members of a wealthy family, que emotional outrage...

Then, conveniently for the journo's, a "no comment' from the survivors, although they do mention it is cause they haven't even had a chance to read the report.

 

Big thumbs down for Paddy Gower and Newshub. Terrible journalism.

  • Upvote 1
Link to post
Share on other sites

This today from Maritime NZ

 

Fatal accident leads to changes for large recreational boats
26 July 2018

Maritime NZ is making changes to safety requirements for recreational vessels leaving New Zealand ports for overseas, and for other recreational vessels in New Zealand waters.

The changes come from recommendations in a detailed, 60-page report into a fatal accident in which two crew members of the yacht Platino died on 13 June 2016.

Within seconds the yacht had gone from sailing comfortably to being significantly damaged and effectively out of control. The boom was swinging uncontrollably across the yacht and hardware connected to it was described by the crew as acting like a wrecking ball.

Almost immediately one crew member was fatally injured when he was hit by hardware connected to the out of control boom, and another was lost overboard, most likely thrown by the boom.

The three crew who survived the accident were rescued by a container ship on 14 June 2016.

Maritime NZ Director, Keith Manch, said work is already underway with Yachting NZ to change Yachting NZ’s Safety Regulations of Sailing that are used for safety inspections of all recreational vessels – sailing or powered – bound for overseas.

Maritime NZ requires all such vessels to be certified by qualified Yachting NZ inspectors before than can leave New Zealand. The vessels must get what is known as a Category 1 safety certificate.

“We will also be working with Yachting NZ and other boating organisations about a range of technical requirements for vessels’ equipment, and particularly about training for skippers and crew, and vessels operating manuals,” Mr Manch said.

“While the changes relate to a range of equipment and procedures, at their heart is the preparedness and training of the skipper and crew.

“The skipper and crew must be familiar with the equipment on board, know how to use it correctly, and know how to respond in an emergency.”

In all the circumstances, Maritime NZ considered the appropriate approach in this case was to use the information gathered through the investigation to improve safety outcomes, without any accompanying enforcement action.

Maritime NZ has sent the report to the Coroner to help inform an inquest.

Link to report www.maritimenz.govt.nz/platino To protect the right to privacy, Maritime NZ’s practice is to not include individuals’ names in reports.

Recommendations

Maritime NZ has made 28 recommendations under seven headings:

·         certification of pleasure craft departing on international ocean voyages

·         autopilot failure

·         preventer failure (a preventer is a device used on a sailing vessel to help prevent uncontrolled swinging of a boom)

·         mainsheet traveler failure (a mainsheet traveler is used to help keep the boom in the right position)

·         person overboard

·         emergency communication

·         command and control.

Background and summary of accident

Platino is a 19.78 metre-long sailing yacht built in 1997-98 and extensively refitted in 2015.

It was certified to Category 1 standard by Yachting NZ on 11 May 2016, and sailed from Auckland bound for Fiji on 11 June 2016 with five crew on board.

The accident occurred on the morning of 13 June 2016, 305 nautical miles (565 km) north-north-east of Cape Reinga in high wind to gale conditions and a confused sea.

Platino turned unexpectedly and dramatically to starboard. The turn was most likely caused by a combination of weather and sea conditions, and a malfunction of the autopilot.

The sudden, unintentional turn set off a trail of damage that left the boom swinging uncontrollably backwards and forwards across the yacht, one crew member fatally injured and another lost overboard, and serious damage that eventually led to the total failure and loss of the mast, boom and rigging.

All three surviving crew saw the crewmember in the water but were unable to provide assistance or aid his rescue. The crew’s options were severely limited by the chaotic and dangerous situation on deck, and a lack of control over the yacht.

The investigation concluded that many factors came together to cause the accident and the severity of its outcomes. One factor was that the crew, all of whom were experienced sailors, had not trained together for emergencies on board this yacht, and was not sufficiently familiar with its particular equipment.

Link to post
Share on other sites

I think its scandalous that its taken 2 years to make the report. The original thread here was closed out of respect for the family ( quite rightly so), but because the report has taken this ludricrous amount of time that then has meant  the boating public has had only anecdote and the yacht club bar  as a source of information.

2 years of people going out on the ocean without the benefit of understanding what actually happened.

I'll have a read of the report when I get a chance, but this has been tragically mishandled in my opinion..

Link to post
Share on other sites

Agree JB the two year wait to publish this is a joke.

Must be some sort of a gravy train as these accident reports wether air or sea are always a long time coming.

And now the bureaucrats rock into action and reinvent the wheel regarding safety specs for offshore voyagers.  

Link to post
Share on other sites

My understanding from someone who was quite close is that there has been a lot of behind the scenes lawyering going on, hence the delay in the report's release. It was indicated that MNZ and the police were looking to make a test case of this tragedy by laying criminal negligence charges. Given the family connections there were the resources to hire some very high powered lawyers. If this had gone thru, it would have been a looming precedent for all skippers of offshore boats.

MNZ is just like Worksafe, has a prosecution culture even to the extent of stretching the law to the limits - check out what they did to a Nelson survey company a few years ago.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Sounds like a horrible ordeal for those left on board. You have to feel for them.

 

Largely understandable causes - mainly a hydraulic leak from the autohelm ram eventually causing a crash gybe, which broke the traveler car loose and turned the nearly 700kg boom into a wildly swinging weapon.

 

It does sound as if there were some preparatory things that could have been done better, particularly setting off to sea without having done much sailing at all on the new systems post refit. Seems the main lesson to take away is to test your systems properly and actually train/prepare for mob and similar situations.

 

I see they mentioned the heavy hard case liferaft didn't have handles and this was a problem - most that I've come across don't and are a total nightmare to try and move around.

 

Also it sounds like it'll lead to cruising boats also having a requirement for advanced sea survival qualified people on board.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Just finished a quick read of the report. Very sobering. Looks like there was a hydraulic leak on the autopilot that caused the initial crash gybe. From there it all turned to poo, but some very interesting points are raised:

 

1. It looks like the problem autopilot was never disengaged, making control of the yacht almost impossible. Hydraulic steering full of air.

2. The MOB alarm was never activated.

3. Nothing was ever thrown overboard to support the MOB.

4. The boom preventer was badly rigged.

5. No lifejackets or harnesses worn at night. They had AIS beacons in their lifejackets!!!

 

Looking at the experience of the skipper (Considerable) it is hard to fathom how she reacted at the time. I can only imagine that she was shocked into inaction.

 

The reaction of MNZ is "More paperwork will stop this happening, and pushing the survival at sea course for cruisers as well as racers". Bollocks.

 

Very detailed report. Not sure on all the conclusions though.

Link to post
Share on other sites

I've only got through the narrative section so far, plus skipped ahead to some of the description of the traveller failure, but a couple of observations based on what I've read so far...

 

The idea that the surviving crew were negligent seems a little harsh. The boat continued to head downwind out of control with a 678kg boom repeatedly swinging from side to side while an unrestrained 350mm/2kg traveller car smashed the helm console off its pedestal, destroyed the bimini and ripped the cockpit table out, propelling it over the side. Each time it swung past, the two in the cockpit had to lay on the deck to avoid being killed like their already dead crewmate. Sure in hindsight, throwing a flotation device would have been a great idea (absolutely no way to know if it would have made a difference in those confused seas - see what happened in the Chicago-Mac). But the description gives the impression that at this point these folks had their hands full just trying to stay alive and had good reason to be genuinely terrified.

 

It also seems that the traveller system simply wasn't designed to be able to withstand dynamic shock loading. I have not, so far, seen any reference to the responsibility of the person who specified/engineered this system. And it certainly wasn't raised (of course) in Newshub's report.

Link to post
Share on other sites

5. No lifejackets or harnesses worn at night. They had AIS beacons in their lifejackets!!!

 

 

Although the mob happened around 11am so wearing a life jacket and or beacon at night wouldn't have helped.

 

Markmt the report does go into detail on the Traveller set up too from pages 33-37.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Totally agree with your conclusions Smithy 

 

The things I take from this is;

If you're on watch sit next to the helm even if you're on autopilot.

Wear harnesses offshore in 30 plus knots. 

Slow down and plan your activities when stuff goes to poo.

 

 

 

Just finished a quick read of the report. Very sobering. Looks like there was a hydraulic leak on the autopilot that caused the initial crash gybe. From there it all turned to poo, but some very interesting points are raised:

 

1. It looks like the problem autopilot was never disengaged, making control of the yacht almost impossible. Hydraulic steering full of air.

2. The MOB alarm was never activated.

3. Nothing was ever thrown overboard to support the MOB.

4. The boom preventer was badly rigged.

5. No lifejackets or harnesses worn at night. They had AIS beacons in their lifejackets!!!

 

Looking at the experience of the skipper (Considerable) it is hard to fathom how she reacted at the time. I can only imagine that she was shocked into inaction.

 

The reaction of MNZ is "More paperwork will stop this happening, and pushing the survival at sea course for cruisers as well as racers". Bollocks.

 

Very detailed report. Not sure on all the conclusions though.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Markmt the report does go into detail on the Traveller set up too from pages 33-37.

 

Yes that's what I was referring to. The point I was trying make, perhaps poorly, is that much of the responsibility for what happened seems (based on what I've read so far, incl the Exec Summary and skim-read Appendix 2 - Recommendations) to have been placed on the Owner/Skipper/Crew (some mild implied criticism of the inspection process), not the engineering of the boat. In the recommendations section on the traveller, all of the recommendations are for the owner/skipper. They go so far as to say "All reasonably practical steps should be taken to ensure uncontrolled gybes do not occur involving heavy equipment such as that installed on Platino." Their earlier description of the engineering of the traveller provides the static design loadings but gives no indication that it was designed for realistic dynamic loads. That seems to me like an important issue that is kind of glossed over. Even a relatively controlled gybe in heavy conditions can generate large dynamic loads.

Link to post
Share on other sites

Haven’t read it all but

I’ve never liked hydraulic steering systems for lots of reasons but this is a fatal flaw in that the auto pilot pump is in the same system as the wheel not two independent systems so once the oil leaked out the wheel was useless

I’ve delivered a yacht with this type of system to Fiji plus sailed a yacht with a single wire to both wheels plus self contained hydraulic auto pilot.

That’s why my boat has independent chains from each wheel plus an electric auto pilot connected to the rudder, nothing is ever perfect but redundancy is your friend when Murphy comes to play.

  • Upvote 1
Link to post
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.
Note: Your post will require moderator approval before it will be visible.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.


×
×
  • Create New...