Enchanter Northland

[CarpeDiem 492]

2 hours ago, K4309 said:

Given the circumstances and outcomes of the rescue, do you think an inquiry is warranted?

The inquiry happened it's findings are documented.

NZ SAR doesn't have rescue helicopters ready to go with wet winching capabilities.  RCC task domestic commercial helicopters and air ambulance helicopters (naso).

NASO helicopters are only available if they aren't already involved in ambulance work.  The aircraft has to be reconfigured on the ground and set up for SAR, this takes a couple of hours to complete.

Defense helicopters do not have wet rated winches - they also have a policy in place that requires that RCC engage commercial and NASO assets before they engage Defense assets.

2 hours ago, K4309 said:

All the assets already exist. 17 rescue helos in the north island, only one dispatched. Why?

Where did you get that there are 17 SAR helicopters in Northland that are set up with wet winching and night vision capabilities.  That certainly was not in the report.

Three helicopters were tasked to the Enchanter, the first to be tasked was tasked to "check out an EPIRB" they had no way of knowing what they would encounter when they arrived - given there are many false EPIRB alarms every month in NZ this seems to me to be an appropriate response.  They could of engaged the Air Force to go have a look - but they would of taken 2 hours to get a plane off the ground and would of been able to provide zero assistance.   Sending a winch enabled helicopter to check out a EPIRB seems to be an appropriate response.

That helicopter winched more people onto the aircraft than it was rated to hold, with one survivor having to be jammed into the floor without seat belts.

After the reports came in, two more helicopters were tasked but they had to be converted to SAR mode, one of the two helicopters had just come off an air ambulance trip and the crew had to be swapped out to meet the flight time restrictions.

The biggest takeaway from the report for me was that no one was wearing life jackets - as a skipper, this really hit me.  My wife and I won't motor to Izzy Bay without life jackets on... I go on a two handed yacht race with a very competent co-skipper and we both wear life jackets with PLBs and AIS!

[Steve Pope 251]

Had the skipper had an automatic inflating life jacket on he most likely wouldn't be in court as he would be dead, trapped underwater by the inflated jacket. Great things if you are above deck, can be deadly if you are below.

[CarpeDiem 492]

1 hour ago, Steve Pope said:

Had the skipper had an automatic inflating life jacket on he most likely wouldn't be in court as he would be dead, trapped underwater by the inflated jacket. Great things if you are above deck, can be deadly if you are below.

Agreed. I dislike auto inflators for that very reason.

Also they are very annoying when you take a wave on the bow... 

[Psyche 684]

We as a nation have chosen to govt fund only a tiny part of day to day SAR and leave the rest up to private organisations. There is no point in complaining about what is essentially a free service to the public unless you also volunteer or go fundraising. As for 17 rescue helicopters on standby with trained crews prepared for an Enchanter incident and within effective flight time of North cape? Somehow I doubt it.

[K4309 320]

2 hours ago, CarpeDiem said:

Where did you get that there are 17 SAR helicopters in Northland that are set up with wet winching and night vision capabilities.  That certainly was not in the report.

I've never said there are 17 SAR helo's in Northland.

Are you guys going to carry on making sh*t up and saying stuff I didn't until I give up and go away?

It is interesting that I've been banging on about only 1 rescue helo for a couple of a days now and you are the first to pull me up on that, congratulations. It does reinforce my perception that most people on here think the skipper is guilty regardless of the facts. This is a good little example that no-one here appears to be across the facts of the charges.

Anyway, there was only ever one helo actively conducting a rescue. The other was finding crew or waiting for fuel.

If you count tasking a helo at 9 am the day after as part of the rescue, I guess you are technically correct in that is a very long straw saying 3 were tasked.

[CarpeDiem 492]

4 minutes ago, K4309 said:

I've never said there are 17 SAR helo's in Northland.

Oh yep, you said North Island. 

 

[K4309 320]

4 minutes ago, CarpeDiem said:

Oh yep, you said North Island. 

 

Geography lesson time.

Northland is not North Island.

Northland is a region of the North Island.

If we are going to have any meaningful dialogue it would be handy if you guys didn't keep on saying stuff I didn't say.

Psyche, I have said there are 17 rescue helos in the North Island. I haven't made any comment about how many are operationally ready at any one time. Again that is something you are making up. Not me. That gives the perception you have a weak arguement and are having to resort to deflection and confusion.

Just saying.

[CarpeDiem 492]

Just now, K4309 said:

Geography lesson time.

Northland is not North Island.

Northland is a region of the North Island.

 

If you want people to participate in the conversation I would suggest that this isn't the way. 

I will bow out again. I feel very silly for re-engaging. 

[K4309 320]

Below is the 'Rescue' section of the TAIC report.

In general, it does not come across as particularly well organised of efficient to me. No criticism of volunteers or rescuers involved. There appears to be no shortage of rescue assets in NZ, as I have been banging on about all along, it is the coordination of the assets and scenario planning (lack of fuel) that appears to be the issue, which is Maritime NZ's responsibility. Instead of focusing on this, there is a strong perception they are going after the skipper for PR purposes.

Apoligies, the copy and paste format is terrible.

Link to report here. MO-2022-201 Charter fishing vessel, Enchanter, capsize, North Cape, New Zealand, 20 March 2022 (taic.org.nz)

Search and rescue

2.18 At 2017 the New Zealand Rescue Coordination Centre (the RCC) received an initial beacon alert from the Enchanter’s EPIRB, indicating a distress off North Cape. Using the registration details for the EPIRB the RCC contacted the Enchanter’s shore base and established that the Enchanter was operating near North Cape. At about 2020 the RCC received the first encoded5 transmission from the EPIRB, which included global positioning system (GPS) coordinates.

2.19 At 2030 the RCC directed the Marine Operations Centre to issue mayday relays on VHF Channel 16, requesting all vessels in the vicinity to aid in the response. There were no vessels in the immediate area at that time. 4 An Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) is designed to transmit its location and verification data to a rescue coordination centre and thus alert search and rescue authorities that an emergency exists. 5 See Appendix 5 for a detailed description of the data obtained from the EPIRB. Final Report MO-2022-201 | Page 6

2.20 At about 2035 the RCC briefed the Coastguard New Zealand (Coastguard) Duty Officer, who was based in Auckland. Coastguard’s northernmost unit, Coastguard Houhora, was then tasked to respond. The RCC also tasked6 the Northland Emergency Services Trust (NEST) 7 helicopter crew based in Whangarei. The NEST crew gave an estimated time to departure of 20–30 minutes. Figure 4: Search and rescue locations

2.21 At 2109 Coastguard advised the RCC that, having conducted a risk assessment, they would not be able to respond at night due to the limitations of their vessel and the severity of the weather forecast. They also believed that there would be no air support in the area until the weather abated. At 2110 NEST advised the RCC there would be a delay while they assembled the appropriate helicopter crew. NEST also requested the RCC to task another helicopter from the Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust (ARHT) to assist with the response, which the RCC completed at approximately 2200.

2.22 At 2205 the NEST helicopter departed from Whangarei. NEST maintained a fuel trailer at Kaitaia Hospital. 8 As this was the most northerly point where fuel would be available, both helicopter crews planned to land and refuel from the trailer to maximise their time on scene at North Cape (see Figure 4).

2.23 At 2250 the NEST helicopter arrived at Kaitaia Hospital to refuel and at 2313 departed Kaitaia, heading for the position coordinates transmitted by the Enchanter’s EPIRB. Meanwhile the ARHT helicopter departed from Ardmore Aerodrome in Auckland at 2252. The NEST helicopter arrived on scene at about 2340 and immediately detected 6 Assigned as an asset to be used for the SAR event. 7 Northland Emergency Services Trust and Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust had at the time merged to become one company, Northern Rescue Helicopter Limited (NRHL). However, they were still in the process of aligning the two previous entities operationally. For the purposes of this report, we have retained their original names for clarity of the narrative. 8 About 95 per cent of their work was in relation to air ambulance services. Page 7 | Final Report MO-2022-201 two light sources. The first was a strobe light in the water. However, it was not attached to anything.

2.24 The second light source was from the vessel’s EPIRB attached to the inverted flybridge, to which the skipper, first mate and one passenger were clinging. The helicopter crew conducted a risk assessment and then lowered a rescue swimmer to the water. The three survivors were then winched on board one-by-one, accompanied by the rescue swimmer.

2.25 By now, New Zealand Police (NZ Police) had been briefed and had set up a forward command post at Te Hapua, the closest point to the search area with road access. At 0013 the NEST helicopter departed the scene and flew the three rescued survivors to Te Hapua, where they were transferred to ambulance staff. While in flight the helicopter crew learned from the survivors that: two people were last seen sitting on the inverted hull; three were in the water; one was in the water (but likely deceased); and one was unaccounted for (but was likely trapped in the inverted hull).

2.26 The NEST helicopter returned immediately to the scene to resume the search. They detected another light source that proved to be from the two passengers on the inverted hull. One of the passengers had used the light from a mobile phone to attract their attention. They had earlier tried to make an emergency 111 call but were unsuccessful because of poor mobile coverage in the area. In a similar fashion to the first retrieval the two passengers were retrieved by 0108. The helicopter crew decided to fly these two survivors directly to Kaitaia Hospital as the helicopter was running low on fuel.

2.27 Meanwhile, the ARHT helicopter had stopped at North Shore Aerodrome to pick up a more experienced winch operator, then at Dargaville to top up with fuel, and again at Kaitaia Hospital to top up with fuel from the NEST trailer before heading to the scene. The two helicopters passed each other in flight and exchanged information.

2.28 The NEST helicopter landed at Kaitaia Hospital and transferred the two passengers to medical staff. The helicopter crew then refuelled from the fuel trailer. However, there was not enough fuel remaining to return to the scene, so that helicopter remained at Kaitaia Hospital.

2.29 The ARHT helicopter arrived on scene at 0130 to begin the search for the five missing people. Meanwhile, the RCC had also tasked a Royal New Zealand Airforce P3 Orion aeroplane (P3) to assist in the search. The P3 arrived on scene at about the same time as the ARHT helicopter. The RCC assigned the P3 as on-scene coordinator9 circling at a higher altitude. The helicopter searched at a lower level in the dark for about an hour and 20 minutes before it too ran low on fuel and landed at the Te Hapua forward command post at 0257.

2.30 Meanwhile, a fuel tanker had been sourced at Kerikeri and was sent northwards, arriving at Kaitaia Hospital at 0511. The NEST helicopter was refuelled, but by then the helicopter crew had exceeded the limits of their work/rest operational hours, thus preventing them from rejoining the search effort. The fuel tanker then travelled north to Te Hapua forward command post, arriving there at about 0700. The ARHT helicopter refuelled and departed for the search area again at 0733. For 4 hours and 36 minutes there were no helicopter air assets able to search because no fuel was available. 9 Coordinator of all search and rescue assets at the scene. The RCC still retained responsibility for overall coordination of the search. Final Report MO-2022-201 | Page 8

2.31 Meanwhile, several vessels had responded to the mayday relay calls. Another of the operator’s fishing charter vessels Pacific Invader had departed Mangōnui and arrived at the search area at 0400. A commercial fishing vessel Florence Nightingale, which had been out at the Three Kings Islands at the time of the accident, arrived soon after 0400. Another commercial fishing vessel Katrina arrived at the search area at about 0612. All three vessels were coordinated into a search pattern or directed to items of interest by the P3 circling above.

2.32 At about 0710 (first light) the body of one of the passengers was located and recovered by one of the surface search vessels. When the refuelled ARHT helicopter had returned on scene, it took over as the on-scene coordinator from the P3, which was by then getting low on fuel. The bodies of another two passengers were recovered over the next 40 minutes, leaving two people still missing.

2.33 Meanwhile, preparing for an extended search operation, the RCC had tasked a second rescue helicopter from AHRT. This second helicopter arrived at the forward command post at 0907 and relieved the first helicopter.

2.34 When the mayday relays had been broadcast, the inshore patrol vessel HMNZS Taupo had been operating in the Hauraki Gulf. It diverted to the search area, arriving on scene at 1110. The RCC assigned HMNZS Taupo with the role of on-scene coordinator, tasked with ensuring all marine assets were searching the designated areas assigned by the RCC. However, the HMNZS Taupo misunderstood the meaning of on-scene coordinator and assumed the naval warfare role of on-scene command, effectively taking control of the search away from RCC.

2.35 Over the following hours multiple assets joined the search including Coastguard Houhora, two other commercial helicopters from Kerikeri and another P3.

2.36 At 1319 the body of a fourth passenger was located and recovered, leaving one passenger still missing. By 1527 the RCC had realised that air assets were not following their assigned search patterns. HMNZS Taupo had directed all assets to search another area, based on their own drift-modelling calculations. After some discussion with HMNZS Taupo, the RCC took back control of the search area.

2.37 Meanwhile the RCC had tasked the NZ Police Dive Squad to fly up from Wellington to dive on the hull in anticipation of locating the final missing passenger. The Dive Squad arrived in the area by 1953 and prepared to dive at first light the following morning, 22 March 2022.

2.38 By 2020 all assets on site had been stood down for the evening. HMNZS Taupo had marked the hull by attaching a rope with a white buoy earlier in the afternoon. The P3 recorded the GPS coordinates of the hull before leaving the scene.

2.39 However, the following morning the inverted hull could not be located. A helicopter was tasked with searching for the upturned hull. At 1239 the hull was located and the vessel with the NZ Police Dive Squad on board was directed to that location. The body of the last missing passenger was recovered from the hull at 1654, marking the end of the search and rescue task.

[K4309 320]

9 minutes ago, CarpeDiem said:

If you want people to participate in the conversation I would suggest that this isn't the way. 

I will bow out again. I feel very silly for re-engaging. 

You were asserting I said statements I didn't say, twisting the context to mean something different. If you have a problem getting called out on that, that is your issue.

[CarpeDiem 492]

7 minutes ago, K4309 said:

You were asserting I said statements I didn't say, twisting the context to mean something different. If you have a problem getting called out on that, that is your issue.

Correct I did say.

And then, when you pointed that out, I acknowledged that you said North Island. 

Rather than accepting that I it wrong and acknowledging my acknowledgement your response was then to throw me an obnoxious geography lesson.

I trust you now have enough clarification to move on?  And possibly enough information to understand why people aren't engaging.

 

[K4309 320]

1 minute ago, CarpeDiem said:

Correct I did say.

And then, when you pointed that out, I acknowledged that you said North Island. 

Rather than accepting that I it wrong and acknowledging my acknowledgement your response was then to throw me an obnoxious geography lesson.

I trust you now have enough clarification to move on?

 

My apologies, I took your response as sarcasm, "oh yep, you said..." rather than an acknowledgment of your error.

In that view, I acknowledge my following post with a "geography lesson" was not warranted.

I would say though that I am feeling frustrated that I have been consistently misquoted on key points, or statements attributed to me that I haven't said that materially change the arguement. That includes Aardvark and pysche, hence my push back on it.

[CarpeDiem 492]

26 minutes ago, K4309 said:

There appears to be no shortage of rescue assets in NZ, as I have been banging on about all along, it is the coordination of the assets and scenario planning (lack of fuel) that appears to be the issue, which is Maritime NZ's responsibility. Instead of focusing on this, there is a strong perception they are going after the skipper for PR purposes.

They tasked the most appropriate asset available to go look for the Epirb.

They then tasked two more when the gravity of the problem became apparent.

MaritimeNZ were not responsible for the fuel cache.

Fueling is the responsibility the local operator, in this case NEST.  The local operator agrees to meet a national standard for rescue aircraft. 

MaritimeNZ can't have caches of fuel scattered around NZ waiting for what if. Jet fuel goes off if left to sit and needs careful management.

Before the incident, NEST already knew they had a fuel availability issue at Kaitiaia  the report is quite clear that the availability of fuel regularly impacted the air ambulance service. 

 

[aardvarkash10 1,034]

Hi K.

You have repeatedly stated that there was 17 helicopters....

Your continued statements gave me the impression that you understood 17 different helicopters were or should have been available to be directed to the search.

If that was not your intended sense, please let me know what you were meaning to say.

The reality is set out very clearly in the report.  There are almost no dedicated, marine capable, SAR helicopter units nationally.  Those units that are available are primarily medical services and aggregated they operate 95% of the time in that configuration.

To operate in SAR configuration they have to physically change the aircraft and call in crew as well as determined the operational requirements.  They also have to consider the operational safety of the crew.  This was the primary reason given for Coastguard not deploying there unit (albeit a rigid inflatable boat not a helicopter) from Hohora.

The report identified why this is a problem and, broadly in line with my contention, the report diplomatically says we are getting the service we are prepared to pay for.

 The report states that, more likely than not, the boat was in the shallows and susceptible to a rogue wave.  The skipper put the boat there, more likely than not.  He either did that deliberately or accidentally.  Even if he did it deliberately, that doesn't mean he was careless, reckless or guilty of neglect.  

I don't have enough knowledge or information to claim whether the skipper was right or wrong (a moral / ethical judgement), guilty or innocent ( a legal judgement with much higher burden of proof).

But the report says what it says.  The boat was in a position of risk and when that risk was realised the boat and it's passengers and crew were not well prepared for what happened next.

RCC acted appropriately in the first instance, and continued to make appropriate decisions overall as events unfolded.  They were not perfect, but they neither caused nor aggregated the event.

It will be interesting to see what changes happen in the response preparation of the various agencies.  From the boating community's point of view, a change to the current SAR settings and relationships could well improve our chances of a successful rescue when needed.

I wonder if we are prepared to pay for that, as a country.

 

[Guest 108]

10 minutes ago, aardvarkash10 said:

 

  The skipper put the boat there, more likely than not.  He either did that deliberately or accidentally.  Even if he did it deliberately, that doesn't mean he was careless, reckless or guilty of neglect. 

 

 

Explain that to me, Not-guilty owing to insanity? Otherwise totally agree. I've banged a few corners,

figuratively. In hind sight it was all three and unnecessary.

[K4309 320]

35 minutes ago, aardvarkash10 said:

Hi K.

You have repeatedly stated that there was 17 helicopters....

Your continued statements gave me the impression that you understood 17 different helicopters were or should have been available to be directed to the search.

If that was not your intended sense, please let me know what you were meaning to say.

 

It will be interesting to see what changes happen in the response preparation of the various agencies.  From the boating community's point of view, a change to the current SAR settings and relationships could well improve our chances of a successful rescue when needed.

I wonder if we are prepared to pay for that, as a country.

 

The context is that 4 guys died waiting for rescue, many hours after it was established they needed rescuing. One helo came, took some and went. The ones that were left all died. I personally find that a harrowing prospect.

I've been banging on about the 17 rescue helos in the North Island to demonstrate there are no shortage of assets. These helos are obviously very expensive to buy, run and maintain, yet we have 17 of them. But somehow these 4 guys were left to die waiting rescue. I haven't reconciled why yet, hence I'm banging on about it.

The MRCC phoned the people on the EPIRB list, so I think it is a fair assumption MRCC knew 10 people were onboard (I need to go back through the TAIC report to clarify the details). Yet there wasn't enough helo capacity to get everyone off, noting there is no shortage of rescue assets nationally.

On Houhora CG, I note they have 27 volunteers and a large RIB. From their FB page, they were non-operational at the end of this summer cause their compass needed swinging.

My next post to CD might outline a way forward.

 

[K4309 320]

2 hours ago, CarpeDiem said:

They tasked the most appropriate asset available to go look for the Epirb.

They then tasked two more when the gravity of the problem became apparent.

MaritimeNZ were not responsible for the fuel cache.

Fueling is the responsibility the local operator, in this case NEST.  The local operator agrees to meet a national standard for rescue aircraft. 

MaritimeNZ can't have caches of fuel scattered around NZ waiting for what if. Jet fuel goes off if left to sit and needs careful management.

Before the incident, NEST already knew they had a fuel availability issue at Kaitiaia  the report is quite clear that the availability of fuel regularly impacted the air ambulance service. 

 

This is good, and makes me think:

Why is a regional charitable trust responsible for provisioning fuel for what I would deem a nationally important service?

If I understand correctly, 5 different organisations were directly involved in or tasked with the rescue, NHRT, AHRT, Coast Guard, Air Force and MNZ (assuming MRCC are part of MNZ).

The helicopter rescue trusts have sporadic and insecure funding. I understand the bulk of their funding comes from what used to be the DHB's. I assume MNZ fund them somehow, possibly a 'pay per rescue' situation (I don't know, haven't done a deep dive into it). A lot also comes from public fundraising. They are also always hitting up city councils and the like.

Coastguard were also tasked, being CG Hauhora. As per above, CG Hauhora have 27 volunteers (not very many I would have thought to maintain operational readiness, along with training, tractor driving, compliance work and fundraising. Their boat recently needed a compass swung to obtain operational status. As in, just cause they exist doesn't mean they can operate.

Now, we have a situation where 4 men died awaiting rescue. There are known issues with the conduct of the rescue.

Recently (a couple of years ago) there were major issues in fighting a wild fire that destroyed houses and claimed a life. Being Chch Port Hills, the fire before the last one. Part of the issue was an array of responsibilities with Rural Fire districts, urban professional fire fighters, volunteer brigades, police and what not.

As a result of that Port Hills Clusterfuck, Fire and Emergency NZ was established.

Here we have what is effectively a failed rescue, in that 4 men died awaiting rescue (note I'm not counting the 5th death who sounds like he drowned in the capsize). We also have a range of different organisations from Statutory Authority, Charitable Trusts and outright volunteer units. We had coordination and resource issues.

Following the Port Hills fire, there was substantial structural changes made to the management of emergency resources (FENZ).

Would it not be logical to consider the same here?

So far we have only had an investigation. (TAIC)

My position is that this situation warrants an inquiry or another equivalent mechanism to effect change. The TAIC report doesn't have the gravity to do that.

We know collectively we are already paying for a huge array or rescue assets (and to touch on Aardie's apolitcal comment, CG are just getting a major funding boost from the current govt). The rescue helo's are already being paid for, either by the DHB's (or whatever that organisation is called now) via MNZ or via community fundraising.

Has NZ got to the point where disparate charities, trusts and volunteer groups can't cope with the demands, and with insecure funding, and what we really need is a sector restructure equivalent to FENZ?

 

PS - I'm not saying FENZ is the silver bullet by any means, but the last Port Hills fire was handled a shitload better than the first one, and that was widely put down to more effective management and coordination.

[harrytom 666]

K4309 or body else wants to be charged a SNR fee as part of their insurance like home owners charged a fire n earthquake levy?? I would be happy enough to pay and those don't get charged.Just like CG do for non members.Not sure how money is recovered from non members though.

[CarpeDiem 492]

2 hours ago, K4309 said:

So far we have only had an investigation. (TAIC)

My position is that this situation warrants an inquiry or another equivalent mechanism to effect change. The TAIC report doesn't have the gravity to do that.

TAIC undertook an inquiry - that's their remit - that's what they do - yes they also investigate.

That's why the documents title is: Maritime inquiry MO-2022-201 Charter fishing vessel Enchanter Capsize

Inquiry's produce recommendations.  Investigations produce facts for the inquiry to process into recommendations.  You can't have an inquiry without an investigation.

The TAIC report is full of recommendations, it even lists the recommendations that were accepted/rejected by NZSAR and MNZ. It is most certainly an inquiry in the true sense of the word.

[Black Panther 1,641]

Let a few people drown. Preparedness and skill levels will improve and fewer  people will drown. (only slightly tongue in cheek)